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SUPPRESSION OF PIRACY AND MARITIME TERRORISM
A Suitable Role for a Navy?
Martin N. Murphy
On 12 October 2000, two men from an organization aligned with al-Qa‘idaloaded a rigid raider (a small boat with glass-reinforced-plastic hull) with
explosives and drove it into the side of the guided-missile destroyer USS Cole
(DDG 67). Seventeen sailors lost their lives. This was a seminal event. It epito-
mized small war versus “big” war and the threat that small-war tactics could
present to “big war” fleets. It was also an echo of the U.S. Navy’s past. As the ini-
tial alarm faded, the Navy’s response became largely inward looking and defen-
sive, limited for the most part to the implementation of more robust
force-protection measures.
On 11 September 2001, al-Qa‘ida operatives hijacked four civilian airliners
and prepared to attack targets in the United States. Three of the planes got
through. Until the attacks of 9/11 gave it context, most of the wider implications
of the attack on the Cole were missed or ignored. It was the attacks on New York
and Washington that put it back on the agenda and sparked a search for similar
scenarios, a search that led ineluctably to concerns about the vulnerability of
commercial shipping. From there it was merely a small conceptual hop to piracy
and the fear that pirates might be in a position to teach terrorists how to use
ships for a variety of purposes, including, most spectacularly, as weapons.1 Since
then the threats of piracy and maritime terrorism have been yoked together.
Is this linkage justified? Does either, separately or together, represent a serious
threat to the United States or its allies? It is important to be honest. The Cole event
was significant, but the criminal, insurgent, and terrorist activity that has taken
place on water both before and since has been of little strategic or political impor-
tance. There is, however, no guarantee that this benign situation will continue.
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Trends in demography and economic growth and the concomitant demand for
natural resources suggest that it might change.2 If this is the case, is the suppres-
sion of maritime criminal, insurgent, and terrorist activity a suitable role for the
Navy? Is it one to which it can make a worthwhile contribution, or one it should
leave to others?
This article will argue that piracy and maritime terrorism are not the main
threats about which the Navy and those with interests in maritime security
should be concerned.3 They are instead just two items on a longer list that can
grouped under four headings:
• Criminal/insurgent/terrorist links
• “Migration to the sea”
• Territorial expansion
• Complex maritime conflict.
It will ask whether the Navy is the most appropriate arm of U.S. national power
to confront these threats. It will argue that if the service is to confront these chal-
lenges effectively, it will need to adjust to ways of warfare that are in many ways
closer to those of the nineteenth than the twentieth century, albeit that the com-
plexity of conflict has increased immeasurably.
CRIMINAL/INSURGENT/TERRORIST LINKS
Although we are quick to talk of terrorism, the current conflict is being fought
not against an abstraction but against specific groups with specific motives,
skills, and resources. Most acts of politically inspired violence at sea have been
perpetrated by insurgent groups. Some of these have been acts of terrorism, but
most have not. Giving these acts the blanket label of “terrorism” serves only to
obscure their purpose and their nature.4 Terrorism is a tactic; an insurgency is an
organized movement that is inspired by political, religious, or even quasi-criminal
motives and uses war and subversion to overthrow a government and achieve
power. Around the world are areas where maritime insurgency and terrorism are
both problems.
In addition to political violence there is criminal violence—that is, piracy.
Criminally inspired violence at sea is more common than politically inspired vi-
olence; nonetheless, piracy is a problem only in certain areas and for certain
states. In addition there are areas where piracy and insurgency are problems.
Even though there are strong grounds for considering piracy and insurgency/
terrorism as two aspects of the larger phenomenon of maritime insecurity—
“disorder at sea”—it is worth considering their differences before looking at
where, if, and how they might come together.
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Piracy
Piracy is a crime defined by geography that requires the presence of other factors,
such as a permissive political environment, cultural acceptability, and the opportu-
nity for reward, in order to flourish. Since the end of World War II such combina-
tions have occurred in only a relatively few places: around parts of Southeast Asia
and in the Bay of Bengal; off East and West Africa; and in a few ports of and off some
stretches of coastline around South America. Most of the factors that encourage and
sustain piracy are enduring. Although it can spring up in places where it has not
been a problem historically—the Indian Ocean coast of Somalia, for example—it is
generally the case that unless local or national leaders find reasons and resources to
suppress it, piracy can persist in such areas, sometimes for centuries.
Piracy is an organized crime. The degree to which it is a threat at any level,
from the purely local to the international, depends on the degree to which is it
organized effectively. Even at the lowest level of organization, piracy, like street
crime or small-scale crime anywhere, can be immensely destructive. If not con-
fronted it can suppress economic activity and distort economic incentives, lower
productivity by increasing security and replacement costs, erode confidence in
authority, and undermine notions of justice. These effects can be observed along
the Straits of Malacca, where gangs of largely Indonesian pirates prey regularly
on fishing craft from communities on the Malaysian side of the waterway. One
study of such a community, Hulan Melintang, has labeled this predation “sus-
tainable,” in that the cost and physical danger it adds to the fishermen’s lives are
never enough to stop them putting to sea completely.5 In other cases, however,
the level of predation has become so acute—against parts of the Nigerian fish-
ing fleet, for example—that lawful economic activity ceases, even if only for a
time, and in some areas can be carried out only with great vigilance.6 The inter-
national fishing boats that ply their trade off part of the Somali coast need to be
on almost constant alert against attack by local boats; one observer described the
situation there as closer to a war than fishing.7 There are, however, genuine ques-
tions as to whether much of the fishing conducted by foreign boats in these wa-
ters is legal or, even if legal, should be allowed, given their rapacity.
In areas that are afflicted by piracy, small gangs can harass and board even
large ships if the weather and sea conditions are right. In order to capitalize on
the vulnerability of these ships and maximize the “take,” gangs need specialized
marine equipment, modern arms, and a network capable of disposing of the
goods and foreign currency they steal. At the highest level of organization, ships
and their cargoes can be stolen to order, a process that demands close coordina-
tion between the buyer and the pirate/contractor. Piracy at this level is what it
has always been, a business. Its effects therefore spread beyond the scene of the
crime. Like all forms of organized criminal behavior—and when piracy reaches
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this stage it ceases to be a stand-alone enterprise and becomes a subsidiary to a
larger criminal concern—its most worrying effect is corruption, which, as it is
argued, “is the main vehicle, and likely the most socially damaging activity, by
which criminal gangs achieve their aims.”8 Another commentator reaches the
same conclusion: “Organized crime makes systematic use of corruption,” an ef-
fect that has not been emphasized sufficiently.9 Small-time pirates, however, are
not necessarily cut out of these more sophisticated operations; they constitute a
pool of skilled labor that pirate-gang masters can call upon when needed.10
Therefore, while the highest-profile consequences of piracy are attacks on
large vessels carrying cargo to international destinations, the greatest damage ei-
ther is felt among already-poor local communities or results from the suborning
of local and national officials, military leaders, and politicians of weak states. In
other words, the number of attacks on international shipping, though it shines a
useful light on the problem, is not a true measure of its effect. For example, in the
last decade or so there were a number of high-profile attacks on ships transiting
the Straits of Malacca. Some of these could have had disastrous consequences if
control from the bridge had been lost completely, but the number of incidents as
a proportion of the total international traffic using the straits, and in relation to
the volume of local traffic, was and remains very small. What the presence of pi-
racy demonstrates wherever it occurs, in this case on the Indonesian side of the
strait in particular, is a worrying lack of order: if not reversed or controlled it
could allow other forms of maritime-related disorder to take root and grow, but
it is difficult to eradicate, because it is an outgrowth of the divisions and corrup-
tion that infect host societies more widely.
Insurgency and Terrorism
Some insurgent campaigns have been mounted on the high seas.11 The majority,
however, have taken place on coastal and inland waters, where their success de-
pends on factors very similar to those that encourage and sustain piracy. Conse-
quently, maritime insurgents operate in similar (often the same) areas as pirates
and in many cases indulge in piracy on their own account. The principal reason
why there have been so few maritime insurgencies is that in very few places
around the world has political conflict coincided with favorable maritime geog-
raphy. The main campaigns have taken place around Sri Lanka, parts of South-
east Asia, and off the Levant; lesser campaigns have occurred around the
Arabian Peninsula, Cuba, and Nicaragua. Nigeria has experienced piracy and
criminal violence since at least the 1970s. The new wave of violence, while it un-
doubtedly emerges out of political discontent and has a substantial political di-
mension, also has a large criminal component. Whether this wave of killings and
kidnappings will develop into a major political insurgency is as yet unclear.
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Although we are living in an era when some terrorist groups are prepared to
embrace annihilation as a legitimate objective, the age-old hunt for publicity,
the “propaganda of the deed,” remains the primary objective of any terrorist
group. In a world of mass, global communication, maritime terrorism need not,
unlike piracy, be defined by geography. That it has been so defined, however, is
due to the fact that (with the exception of al-Qa‘ida) the groups that have em-
ployed it so far have been, like most insurgent groups, geographically specific.
Furthermore, few maritime targets have propaganda value, and the groups in-
terested in using the sea have not yet found a cost-effective way of generating de-
sired effects from those that do. Even the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE), fighting for an independent Tamil homeland on Sri Lanka and drawing
much support from the Tamil “diaspora” around the world, have not under-
taken terrorist acts outside home waters.
Al-Qa‘ida has done most to shrug off the shackles of geography but has suc-
ceeded only up to a point: its three successful or near-successful attacks have
taken place around what it would regard as its heartland, the Arabian Peninsula.
Other al-Qa‘ida attacks around that peninsula, including an elaborate plan to
attack U.S. warships in the Strait of Hormuz using a combination of small, fast
attack craft and a mother ship laden with explosives, have been disrupted, as
were an attempted attack on American and British naval vessels in the Strait of
Gibraltar in 2002 and a plan to attack U.S. warships in Singapore, also in 2002.
The latter was to have been carried out with the assistance of the local al-Qa‘ida
affiliate, Jemaah Islamiyah.
On land, al-Qa‘ida’s ideal targets mix iconic status with a high casualty poten-
tial. There are few iconic targets at sea; the main ones are warships, and since the
Cole attack in 2000, all navies have taken additional precautions that, while far
from perfect, are probably sufficient to make any repetition harder to accom-
plish. Passenger ferries and cruise ships would make excellent mass-casualty tar-
gets, and a very small number of cruise ships combine this quality with iconic
status. Cruise ships, although not constructed to naval standards, are extraordi-
narily robust, with many watertight subdivisions, and are hard to sink. That,
though, hardly matters if the objective is mass panic (probably resulting in large
numbers of accidental deaths and injuries) and vivid media images of
bomb-blackened hulls and petrified Westerners. The concerns of the insurance
market are reflected in a recent RAND study pointing out that such an attack, if
even minimally successful, would give rise to substantial claims and have a po-
tentially catastrophic economic effect on the cruise industry.12
Al-Qa‘ida recognizes the importance of economic targets, although its at-
tacks so far have been limited to oil-related installations. The first was on the
Limburg, a very large crude-oil carrier, partially loaded, in 2002. This attack
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hardly affected the world energy market, but it is important to note that it took
place at a time of slack demand and that a similar attack (or more worryingly,
multiple attacks) carried out when the market is tight might have more serious
repercussions. The second attack, on the al-Basra oil terminal off Iraq, would
have affected oil prices and, in addition, undermined confidence in U.S. military
competence had it been successful; in fact the raiders came perilously close to
reaching their objective, but they were foiled, albeit at the cost of three American
lives. However, a strategy of economic dislocation focusing solely on maritime
targets would be neither easy nor necessarily fruitful. It would require coordina-
tion, persistence, and probably a sophisticated understanding of market dynam-
ics. It would also demand resources, and these are what almost all terrorist
groups lack, certainly those that cannot call on state support.
These are probably among the factors that have led al-Qa‘ida to concentrate
on land-based economic targets in preference to those at sea. The one worth-
while example that demonstrates what could possibly be achieved using mari-
time targets alone was the mining of Nicaragua’s harbors in the mid-1980s by
“Contra” groups. This precisely targeted campaign, timed to coincide with the
main export season, was designed to limit the country’s vital foreign earnings,
but it depended on covert American assistance for its success.
Coastal raiding is such a well established naval method that it is perhaps sur-
prising terrorists have not used it more frequently. The Philippine Abu Sayyaf
Group (ASG) has grabbed hostages from beach resorts on two occasions (each
of which yielded a substantial profit), and the LTTE has carried out or attempted
raids on Sri Lankan harbors, but no group has carried out pure terror raids on
the beaches, hotels, resorts, or shopping malls that populate the coasts of many
developed states or of Western vacation destinations.
Robbery, Kidnapping, and Logistics
Terrorists and insurgents have therefore been largely unsuccessful in their at-
tacks on maritime targets. Certainly when measured against the criteria that
matter to them—numbers of casualties and psychologically effective publicity—
they have largely failed. Where they have been more successful is in robbing
maritime and coastal targets and capturing hostages for ransom—acting, in
other words, like pirates. Three groups—Abu Sayyaf, the Acehenese separatist
group Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), and politico-criminal gangs operating in
the Niger Delta—have successfully taken hostages from beaches, ships, or off-
shore oil installations and exchanged them for ransom. The actions of ASG and
GAM in particular have drawn the piracy label.
Insurgents and terrorists have also used the sea successfully for logistical pur-
poses. It is worth remembering that around 90 percent of the world’s trade
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moves by ship. While terrorists and insurgents are likely to move a smaller pro-
portion of their material requirements by ship, that proportion, because of cir-
cumstances specific to each group, could still be substantial, perhaps 50 percent.
Hezbollah and some of the other anti-Israeli groups move large quantities of
arms into Lebanon and Gaza by sea, al-Qa‘ida and its affiliates are known to have
moved bomb materials by sea prior to both the East African and Bali attacks, and
the LTTE, GAM, and the various Philippine groups all operate in what are essen-
tially maritime theaters. More generally, many terrorist and insurgent groups to-
day do not live off the local population in the same way as their forebears did
(and as described by Mao Zedong). Particularly if they originate from outside an
operational area, they tend to be wealthier than the indigenous population and
look to external supply for the money and often sophisticated weapons they
employ.
In many cases large consignments can be moved more discreetly by sea. On
land, vehicles can be subjected to inspection relatively easily. In coastal waters,
however, insurgents can hide among a multiplicity of small craft and fishing
boats—a problem that confronts the Israeli air force and navy off the coast of
Gaza, for example, as it seeks to isolate arms smugglers from ordinary fishermen.
Outside territorial waters there are fewer ships, but international law can shield
cargo from inspection. Unless a sea area is subject to a United Nations Security
Council resolution that permits such an action, a boat or ship can be boarded only
with flag-state consent unless it is of questionable nationality or is suspected of
slaving, piracy, or that most heinous of international maritime crimes, illegal
broadcasting.13 Of course, ships are boarded with the consent of their masters,
but, depending upon the provisions of his own national legislation, not every
master can give a boarding party permission to search; any search or seizure car-
ried out on the basis of such consent is illegal. Such acts can yield valuable intelli-
gence, but the advantage might be short-lived; they can provoke retaliatory
harassment and international opprobrium. If a search is conducted on the basis of
inaccurate information and nothing is found, the only results will be acute embar-
rassment, a claim for compensation, and a further erosion of international good-
will. The alternative is the “if you don’t like it sue me” position, which if carried
out mid-ocean would almost certainly be acceded to but is manifestly illegal and
almost inevitably involves the use or threat of force. The bottom line in most cases
where boarding is refused is that “you can look but not touch.”
The Proliferation Security Initiative
What the case of the North Korean cargo vessel So San in 2002 demonstrated,
however, is that even a boarding party that has forced itself on board, looked,
touched, and found a suspicious cargo—in this case Scud missiles—cannot
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confiscate it if buyer and seller are able to demonstrate that their transaction was
legal.14 It was this case that spurred the George W. Bush administration to insti-
gate the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).15 This program seeks to bring to-
gether like-minded states prepared to open their own flag vessels to inspection
and to interdict vessels with suspicious cargoes once they enter their territorial
waters. The United States has also used its leverage with the major “open regis-
ter” (that is, flag of convenience) states, such as Panama and Liberia, to sign
workable ship-boarding agreements.16 Previously it had virtually forced the clo-
sure of the Tongan register on the suspicion that it might be holding the registra-
tion of several ships of which al-Qa‘ida was the beneficial owner. (The suspicion
in this case appears to have been erroneous but understandable, given the often
extensive measures even legitimate owners use to hide their beneficial interests
in order to evade tax or other legislated obligations.) The aim of the ship-boarding
agreements with the open-register states is to restrict the space in which rogue
shippers can hide.
Large gaps, of course, remain. Around half of the world’s vessels are flagged in
states that are not PSI signatories.17 Also, most open-register states have not
signed, including some, like Cambodia, Saint Vincent, and the Grenadines, that
have long been suspected of less than rigorous procedures. At the same time
there are closed-register states, such as Iran and North Korea, that are not ame-
nable to either pressure or persuasion; another closed-register nation, China,
though sympathetic to U.S. proliferation concerns, is not persuaded of the
scheme’s legality.
Blurring the Gray Area
Criminals and terrorists are not finding common cause, but they are finding rea-
sons to cross the species barrier, whether based on the sea or on the land. The
first reason is that both insurgents and terrorists are prepared to do business
with criminals who have specific goods or skills they need, such as forged docu-
ments, or services that can expedite their operations, such as smuggling net-
works that can infiltrate operatives into specific destinations. Terrorists are
known, for example, to have used the human smuggling networks that move
people across the Mediterranean and into Western Europe.
The second reason is that they are acting like criminals in their own right.18
Running an insurgency or terrorist operation requires hard cash.19 It was com-
mon in the past for mature or senescent groups to turn to crime. More recent ex-
perience indicates two different trends. The first is acts of terrorist violence by
small bands of individuals who, while they might share an ideology with an es-
tablished group, have little or no direct connection to it, sometimes as a matter
of choice. Lacking resources, they have had to resort to robbery or other crimes,
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such as drug dealing, in order to buy what they need, as the German
Baader-Meinhof gang did in the 1970s. The second trend has affected estab-
lished groups. Historically, insurgents and terrorists have depended to a large
extent on the support of sympathetic states, but as this has been reduced—
although by no means eliminated, as the strong Iranian support for Hezbollah,
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hamas clearly shows—such groups have turned
to a variety of other income sources, of which criminal activity is one. Terrorist
involvement in drug crime, for example, is well known. A Congressional Re-
search Service report lists four reasons why criminals and terrorists might cooper-
ate: to create chaos and instability in source and transit countries; to encourage a
climate where corruption is acceptable and intimidation is unopposed; to pro-
vide cover and a common infrastructure for their joint and separate activities;
and most important of all, for money.20 The narcoterrorist phenomenon, as
epitomized by FARC in Colombia, is merely the most obvious example of insur-
gent criminal behavior as groups including al-Qa‘ida have become involved in a
wide range of illegal enterprises, including arms trading, dealing in counterfeit
goods, money laundering, and migrant smuggling. In other cases, of which the
LTTE is the prime example, insurgent/terrorists have sold their services to crim-
inals. In the LTTE’s case, what they have sold has been access to their shipping
network.
The range of criminal activity at sea is already large and appears to be grow-
ing. Maritime illegal activity includes arms smuggling, drug smuggling, people
smuggling, toxic waste dumping, illegal fishing, and, of course, piracy. Insur-
gents, terrorists, and criminals are, nonetheless, wary of each other: insurgents
and terrorists distrust criminals’ traditionally poor operational security; crimi-
nals have traditionally been unwilling to court the additional law enforcement
attention attracted by association with groups that practice politically moti-
vated violence.21 When it comes to piracy itself, there is no worthwhile evidence,
despite the speculation, of any cooperation between pirates and insurgent/
terrorists. Even in the absence of a connection, however, criminal activity can
serve the aims of terrorists and insurgents simply by masking what they do. Fur-
thermore, the nature of criminal organization appears to be changing. Although
disciplined, hierarchical, mafia-type organizations continue to flourish, more
nonhierarchical groups are beginning to appear. They mirror the network struc-
ture of many terrorist or insurgent organizations. Decision making occurs on a
more distributed basis, often by gang members who have less reluctance than is
traditionally the case to associate with terrorists or who might, in some cases,
share their aspirations and their contempt for established authority.
Several factors have influenced the growth of transnational organized crime:
porous borders; the migration of ethnic groups who, once they have settled in
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developed countries illegally, become vulnerable to exploitation; access to more
efficient money-transfer mechanisms; and better communication. Although it
is difficult to identify one that has particular application to the sea, they all re-
volve around movement—the movement of commodities, such as arms and
drugs, and the movement of people.22 The principal medium for movement was,
and remains, the sea. This increasing ease of movement has been attributed to
the somewhat weightless notion of “globalization,” but there are also other
trends, which, while far from criminal in themselves, suggest that the level of
criminal activity at sea is likely to grow still further.
“MIGRATION TO THE SEA”
The sea’s resources have of course been exploited for centuries, but that exploita-
tion has now reached unprecedented levels driven by the demand for resources
and living space on land. It has spurred what could be described as a migration
to the sea, or what one astute observer has described more graphically as a
“scramble for the sea,” language chosen quite deliberately to evoke parallels with
the colonial “scramble for Africa” in the nineteenth century.23 This migration or
scramble is driven by the need for energy (in the form of oil, gas, or structures
that capture wind or tidal power), for minerals, for drinking water distilled from
the sea, for waste disposal, and for food (harvested either from increasingly de-
pleted fish stocks or from fish farmed in sheltered waters). It is propelled also by
the urge to exploit the world’s maritime ecosphere for tourism and leisure, in
some places by the need for space to live, either on reclaimed land or actually on
(or perhaps under) the sea, and in others by the desire for such space—for exam-
ple, in South Pacific island lagoons or the “palm” structures extending out from
Dubai.24
All of these pressures will mean that the sea will become more populated and,
consequently, contested.25 More people means more economic activity. More
economic activity means more crime. More crime means more cover for terror-
ists. More people and more economic activity mean more targets. More goods in
transit on fewer but larger ships passing though fewer giant ports and an un-
changeable number of narrow choke points will mean that opportunities for
successful interdiction by criminals or insurgents will increase.
TERRITORIAL EXPANSION
Complicating this picture further is the possibility that this migration will be ac-
companied by the seaward extension of state territoriality. It is possible to envis-
age a return to the confused situation that existed prior to the adoption of the
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), when states claimed various
degrees of territorial supervision, up to two hundred miles from their shores
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and in some cases beyond. About 40 percent of the world’s ocean surface lies
within that two-hundred-mile limit.26 The risk in the case of states that have
proved unwilling or unable to discharge their security responsibilities in these
maritime zones is that criminal activity and the illegal exploitation of resources
will increase and what are effectively criminal and pirate sanctuaries might be
created.27
The law of the sea developed in a way that is very different from the law of the
land, and in a way that was neither obvious nor preordained. As has been
pointed out, the current position represents the “triumph of Grotius’s thesis of
mare liberum and its concomitant prohibition on claims of territorial sover-
eignty. That triumph reflected not only the transitory nature of human activity at
sea, but a rational conclusion that the interests of states in unrestricted access to the
rest of the world outweighed their interests in restricting the access of others.”28
That consensus is under pressure, perhaps most powerfully for environmen-
tal reasons, and although UNCLOS, the international treaty that currently en-
shrines the notion of maritime freedom, is holding for the moment, the
pressures exerted for and against that freedom are finely balanced and might
well become so great as to fracture it. The expectation historically would have
been that the maritime powers would defend maritime freedom. Today, instead,
they and the rising economic powers of Asia are ambivalent. The continuing re-
luctance of the United States, the current maritime hegemon, to sign UNCLOS
(rather than merely, as it now does, tacitly observe its provisions), even if only to
be in a position to influence what follows, is particularly puzzling and could lead
to a disastrous situation where the free movement of trade and shipping is ham-
pered.29 In the waters of strong states this could take the form of authorized ha-
rassment; the proliferation of sophisticated subsurface weaponry is particularly
worrying in this regard. It is worth recalling that both the USS Pueblo and SS
Mayaguez incidents were sparked by differences between the United States and
coastal states over the width of their territorial waters. The seizures by Iran of
British Royal Marines in 2004 and a boarding party of British sailors and ma-
rines in 2007, though both clearly planned provocations, were also mounted in
disputed waters.30 In the case of weak states, this hampering could take the form of
predation by criminally or politically motivated nonstate actors. All the inhibi-
tions that restrain action against weak states on land could be extended to the sea.
Maritime Disorder and the Threat to Free Movement at Sea
The potential threats that therefore confront all maritime users and every power
that values the freedom of the seas are not piracy or maritime terrorism alone.
Those are just two among several that can be viewed collectively as problems of
maritime disorder. Participants can move between activities—legal fishermen
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can fish illegally, illegal fishermen can be pirates, pirates can be smugglers,
smugglers can move weapons and men for terrorists, terrorists can kidnap fish-
ermen for ransom, and so on—and each activity can influence and create op-
portunities for another, to a point that could spark conflict. The context within
which these conflicts will take place is likely to be one of increasing legal confu-
sion and political ambiguity as different states assert different rights over the sea
space. These assertions will for the most part fall just short of actual claims of
territoriality, at least for the time being, but the sum effect will be a gradual ero-
sion of the modern world’s shared understanding that movement on the high
sea is free for all.
“Defense of Trade”
From at least the end of the seventeenth century, defense of “trade” was a mis-
sion central to a navy’s purpose. Mahan, even though he is known more widely
as the champion of fleet-on-fleet combat, recognized both that the free move-
ment of trade was a vital sinew of national power and that the trading system
upon which that power depended was far from secure. In his words, the sea was
“the great highway.” He would have concurred with Sir Walter Raleigh that
“whosoever commands the sea commands trade; whosoever commands the
trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and consequently the
world itself.” Even Ralph Peters, a strategic commentator with a famously “up
and at ’em” view of military power, has suggested that the Navy, by focusing on
neutralizing opposing naval forces and projecting expeditionary power, has
overlooked its decisive role, “the ability to protect our maritime trade while inter-
dicting that of the enemy.”31 For, despite the focus on instant communication,
rapid travel, and global capital flows, all of which appear to be unrelated to the
manufacture and distribution of physical goods, globalization is fundamentally
about trade, the physical movement of weighty goods and commodities. Despite
this, the very phrase “defense of trade” sounds archaic and the suggestion dated.
Yet any navy that has lost sight of its economic mission to protect the seaborne
commerce of its own country or the trading system to which its country belongs
has become detached from its roots and reality.32
Countering threats to free navigation, even when they come from irregular
opponents such as pirates and terrorists, is a “defense of trade” task. However,
“defense of trade,” with its blunt clarity, has been replaced by a term altogether
more vague: maritime security. The terminological change is nonetheless justi-
fied, because the challenge has indeed become more diverse and more complex.
The conflicts that will arise under the new rubric are unlikely to follow the pat-
terns of twentieth-century naval engagement. As with the conflicts that are likely
to accompany the “migration to the sea,” the chances are that they will mimic the
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changing patterns of irregular war that have been the predominant form of land
warfare for the last fifty years.
COMPLEX MARITIME CONFLICT
Seaward migration will mean that the human and informational terrain of
coastal waters will become crowded. The conflicts there will be fought among
confusing numbers of people, not all of whom will be engaged; the majority of
participants, in fact, will be the partially engaged, the previously engaged, and
the unengaged. David Kilcullen, a perceptive observer of the wars that land
forces have found themselves fighting in just these circumstances, has urged
ground commanders to think in terms of “mission space,” in which “battle
spaces” erupt as part of what he has called “complex irregular warfare”:
Armed forces today must deal with many adversaries beyond their traditional oppo-
nents, the regular armed forces of nation states. These include insurgents, terrorists,
organized criminals and many other actual and potential adversaries. This creates a
multilateral and ambiguous environment, leading to vastly increased complexity. In-
stead of a traditional “bilateral” construct—two opposing sides—armed forces now
find themselves in a conflict “ecosystem” that includes numerous armed or unarmed
actors capable of posing a serious threat to mission success, but against whom the ap-
plication of military force is at best problematic. Thus, while in a previous era of war-
fare armed forces sought to capture and control territory (a “terrain-centric approach”)
or to destroy in battle the main forces of the enemy (an “enemy-centric approach”)
they must now seek to dominate the entire environment, including a variety of dis-
parate threat elements, and other challenges which are the result of conflict such as
humanitarian and reconstruction tasks.33
Kilcullen has two important foci here. The first is the challenges of urban
conflict; his comments, however, are just as relevant for the topographically and
hydrographically complex terrain of coastal waters and the adjacent land. The
trends that are driving seaward migration mean that in many parts of the world
these regions will develop into increasingly complex zones of conflict; and that
conflict will bear the hallmarks of complex irregular warfare. The second is that
technologically advanced “naval and air platforms with networked information
capability to generate precision strike” is part of an approach that has not proven
to be particularly workable in the face of irregular threats.34
WHAT IS THE NAVY FOR?
What is a modern navy? It is a service in search of a role. With a diverse range of
competitors that might need to be confronted and allies who might need to be
supported, the U.S. Navy has an embarrassment of choices. Many of these
choices, moreover, are potential rather than immediate. They call for investment
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and preparation now for contingencies that might be realized only in years or
decades.
What is so disconcerting is that the conflict the United States (and its allies) is
engaged in right now has more in common with the nineteenth than the twentieth
century. It is made up of overlapping small wars, each of indeterminate duration
against enemies that are illusive, that some analysts have labeled “protean,” and
that find shelter in weak states and operate in the anonymous alleyways of third-
world cities and the urban sprawl of Western slums.35 In the equally bitter domestic
contest for scarce resources, navies have sought a way to demonstrate their rele-
vance to this conflict. That, however, is not immediately apparent either to the
observer who is uninformed about the enduring importance of the sea or to many
in the Navy itself who have been brought up in the Mahanian tradition and are
concerned that consideration is once again being given to roles it was possible to
believe had been left in the wake of the Great White Fleet.
All armed services exist to advance state interests by killing people and break-
ing things or by threatening to kill people and break things. The paradox, how-
ever, is that for all their purposeful brutality, their continuing effectiveness
depends on maintaining a delicate balance between morale and materiel.
Navies, in particular, are hugely expensive organizations. Because navies are so
expensive and take so long to acquire the skills and ships they need, they can of-
ten achieve their effect as much by being as by fighting. That is, the length of time
it takes a navy to become effective means that its very existence can deter a rival.
This enduring quality can often be overlooked in time of peace. In the current
period of ambivalence, when people appear uncertain as to whether we are at
peace or at war and wish to maintain the illusion that such neat categories are
still relevant to the world in which they live, this naval myopia appears particu-
larly acute. The consequences of uncertainty are revealed starkly in the fate of
the Royal Navy, which, lacking strategic direction and political support since the
end of the Cold War, has been reduced to a shadow of its former self by succes-
sive governments.36 The U.S. Navy must look at it and quiver, wondering if simi-
lar strategic ignorance might infect its own political paymasters. The question
those paymasters are asking, of course, and that the Navy needs to answer, is:
What does it exist for?
A Traditional Role Restored
The purpose of this article has not been to answer that question in all its com-
plexity but to direct attention to one aspect of a navy’s purpose, maritime secu-
rity. The definition of “maritime security” as used by navies (insofar as any
definition is agreed) is more restrictive than that understood generally by the
wider maritime community of international organizations, law enforcement
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agencies, and commercial shippers. Many would argue that “maritime security”
is what navies have always done, and this lack of congruence between the two inter-
pretations appears to underlie many of the debates about the Navy’s role in what
is, without doubt, a more complex maritime environment. Furthermore, its re-
introduction at a time when navies have been debating their futures has not
been entirely welcome, because all three of its constituent tasks from a naval per-
spective—defense of trade, homeland defense, and maritime irregular warfare—
demand more ships. In particular, they demand relatively unsophisticated ships.
This runs counter to the acquisition policy pursued by all major navies over the
past fifty years, an ever-shrinking number of higher-quality platforms, a policy
driven by an enemy, the Soviet Union, whose approach to warfare followed a
similar trajectory. Many current and several potential future opponents have de-
cided, however, that, for the time being at least, this is not a race they wish to enter
and that they will instead fight what the British army general Rupert Smith has
called “war among the people.”37
Major navies have a very real dilemma: unsophisticated ships asked to fight a
sophisticated enemy are likely to be sunk. Expeditionary warfare against a capa-
ble opponent, which is what navies have focused on fighting since 1990, de-
mands a sophisticated fleet with a full range of capabilities. The argument that
these ships can be used for lesser tasks is not really sustainable. First and fore-
most, there are not enough of them; secondly, they are simply too expensive to
be risked in low-intensity tasks, where much of their highly destructive weap-
onry would be inappropriate; and lastly, their crews, if they are to remain effec-
tive against sophisticated enemies, need to train continuously for the war they
are intended to fight.
Nonetheless, as Clausewitz pointed out, war is a chameleon and enemies are
not static. Even potential adversaries who current assessments suggest will fight
conventionally are unlikely to attack Western navies at their strongest point or
on the terms those navies prefer. The risk Western naval forces run is of being
prepared for and focused on high-technology warfare they might never have to
fight while leaving themselves underprepared and ill equipped for a form of
warfare that they probably will, including the “long war” against salafist,
Islamist extremism, characterized by sovereignty concerns, political and legal
ambiguity, the criticality of intelligence, and the savagery of small-unit action,
all played out on the big screen of the wider information war.38 They are, in other
words, likely to encounter more frequently and in more places Rupert Smith’s
“war among the people.” As has been suggested, “The Big War paradigm might be
comforting and conducive to justifying a large share of the national treasure. But
its relevance to today’s geopolitical disorder is questionable.”39 Furthermore, the
idea that we are living in an interlude and that normal service will be resumed
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when “Big War” comes back is incomplete and ahistorical. Irregular or “small”
war has existed throughout history. Even as organized forces clashed at Cannae,
Breitenfeld, Waterloo, Gettysburg, Verdun, and Khe Sanh, the drumbeat of con-
flicts on the edge of ancient empires, colonial wars, the wars of America’s west-
ward expansion, the anticolonial wars, and the Cold War “wars of liberation”
continued uninterrupted.
What Is the Source of Maritime Disorder?
Disorder at sea is multifarious. Talk of “disorder” presupposes an order, yet the
notion of the freedom of the seas as articulated by the Dutch philosopher Hugo
Grotius in 1609 depends on a very restrictive idea of order outside the narrow
strip of territorial water over which each coastal state has control. The gradual
acceptance of his restrictive notion created the first global “common.” Being a
common, it is anarchic; even the very minimal order that has existed upon it has
always been exerted by a hegemon. That order has depended, in other words, on
the self-interest of an imperial or global power or powers to enforce it, either
alone or with the help of regional allies. In the absence of such a self-interested
power or powers, seafarers have generally been subject to the depredations of
criminals or state-sponsored privateers. This is how it has always been and will
continue to be for the foreseeable future. Those who argue that the security of a
global common can be exercised through treaties or “regimes,” rather than hege-
monic power, in anything other than a limited or temporary sense have scant ev-
idence upon which to base their faith.
In Grotius’s vision this anarchic state applied only to the high seas—that is to
say, the area beyond the territorial limit. In reality it existed right up to the coast
of any and every state that was unable to enforce its own will over its territorial
waters. The same applies today in the case of failed states, such as Somalia, Sierra
Leone, and Papua–New Guinea.40 In the case of weak states such as Indonesia,
the Philippines, and Bangladesh, it can also extend right up the coast in some ar-
eas and can even affect major ports such as Chittagong or Lagos if the authorities
are underfunded or corrupt. Failed and weak states can provide criminals and
terrorists with sanctuary. Weak states where order is more a semblance than a re-
ality can, ironically, provide more secure shelter for criminals and terrorists than
do failed states, because weak but corruptible law enforcement can protect them
from internal enemies and deter external powers and international organiza-
tions from pursuing them directly, by the fear that such action will make an al-
ready bad situation worse.
What Is the Role of the United States?
What then is the role of the United States, and what has it to do with the suppres-
sion of piracy and maritime terrorism? The United States must pursue its
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self-interest; it must “please itself in the process of serving the general good”;
otherwise, “a praiseworthy desire to improve conditions here or there must
prove too shallow a motive to bear the traffic when unexpected costs are suf-
fered.”41 That general good manifestly includes the maintenance of good order
and freedom of movement at sea. Although the United States prides itself on its
maritime heritage, it is more of a continental island than a nation that depends
on the sea. Vast oceans have protected it, and it has historically been untroubled
by anything other than homegrown maritime disorder. It therefore subscribes to
the illusion that maritime security is at most times and in most places a law en-
forcement problem, one that is properly the concern of coast guards. This is
strange, given that the first serious action in which the fledging U.S. Navy en-
gaged was the suppression of Barbary piracy. But then again, perhaps not—the
predators of the Barbary Coast were in fact servants of the Barbary states, who
owed allegiance to the Ottoman sultan. They were, in other words, not pirates in
pursuit of private gain but effectively privateers; they provided these local lords
with what today would be termed “contractor support.” What the Navy was con-
fronting then was not a law enforcement problem but a political one, because
what the Barbary pirates did was perfectly legal.42
Consequently, although the U.S. Coast Guard has a leading role when it comes
to ensuring maritime security in home waters, it can play only a supporting role
globally, because the problem, which is primarily political, is the same now as it
was then. This is undoubtedly the case when it comes to international waters.
The suggestion that operations on inland and coastal waters are substantially
different from those on deep water (and, by implication, that the former is more
suited to coast-guard activity whereas the latter is the preserve of the gray-hulled
navy) is seductive but wrong.43 Although each venue has different operational
characteristics, they are essentially a continuum that criminals, insurgents, and
terrorists have no hesitation in exploiting. The Navy must do the same. The ad-
vantages cited for coast guards include a lower political profile that, it is said, is
less threatening in situations where sovereignty is an issue and the fact that they
are generally cheaper to establish and maintain.44 The argument also seeks to
draw a hard line between the “defense of trade” and “constabulary” missions,
but this line will be increasingly hard to draw as the seas become more crowded
and the operational seascape more complex.
The Political Dimension of Naval Operations
Navies are different from the other armed services. Killing people and breaking
things in the service of the state constitute only part of what they do—histori-
cally, only a very small part. Navies have always been aware of the political conse-
quences of their actions. They have therefore often been more willing than other
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armed services to exert their influence politically rather than militarily. The
growing political challenge will be to secure both the ocean spaces and the
coastal waters, upon which human activity will encroach more and more. It will
require political sensitivity more than law enforcement acumen. It will also re-
quire that all the levers of national power be applied and focused with political
confidence and determination. Providing that the U.S. Navy can absorb the les-
sons that ground forces have learned so painfully over the last half-century and
adapt its force structure and training accordingly, it has the substantially greater
resources and the vital relationships with its naval counterparts that will be nec-
essary to tackle the maritime security role effectively.
But, given the current wave of anti-Americanism that is sweeping the world,
is America in a position to anchor the global maritime order? It appears that
anything America touches or anything with which it is associated is tainted and
provokes an immediate and negative reaction. But even if so, there is no alterna-
tive to American leadership, for the moment at least. The effect of this wave of
resentment and suspicion has been to set American political and military lead-
ers a very delicate task. When promoting the “thousand-ship navy” the United
States is right to be as backward as it can be when coming forward. Necessary hu-
mility is not, however, a substitute for clear leadership. Free markets demand
free movement at sea, free from harm. Subtlety is not a substitute for strength
but its servant. As Teddy Roosevelt admonished: “Speak softly and carry a big
stick; you will go far.”
The Future of Maritime Disorder
Piracy and terrorism show no apparent links, but the presence of piracy is a pos-
sible indicator that the conditions exist for maritime insurgency or maritime
terrorism to take root.45 As the issue has been put, “While we should not take pi-
racy as a marker for terrorism, it is a useful indicator of the level of security in
the area.”46 How maritime insurgents and terrorists might exploit opportunities
in the future can only be a matter of speculation. What will motivate them, how-
ever, is quite clear. The constraints, geography and opportunity, will remain the
same, and so too will the imperative: the need to respond to political circum-
stances on land.47 Only if political circumstances change on land will insurgents
and terrorists need to operate at sea. Among the salient characteristics of salafist,
Islamist terrorism have been its mobility and its willingness to support local
groups with specialist knowledge, even if that support amounts to little more
than advice and political exhortation. The concern must be that unless naval
forces are prepared to confront such eventualities, there is a good chance those
groups will succeed.
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For example, if U.S. forces are constrained to operate from sea bases because
local conditions preclude secure land bases, a sea base might well become a tar-
get if it is in confined waters, such as those of the Persian Gulf or the eastern
Mediterranean.48 Alternatively, if salafist organizations are able to gain foot-
holds in areas where political change or instability might allow them to operate
with greater freedom than they do now, and where the sea might offer them sig-
nificant opportunities, that combination might increase the incentive to place
greater emphasis on the development of a maritime capability than is the case
currently. In the first instance, it is likely that terrorists and insurgents will de-
velop the capacity to do more of what they are doing now—moving cadres,
equipment, and money. Thereafter they could possibly build on this expertise to
develop an attack and area-denial capability to interdict international trade,
hinder the free movement of naval forces, and impede access to littoral waters.
Keeping the constraints of geography and opportunity firmly in mind, South-
east Asia, the Horn of Africa, and the eastern Mediterranean are all maritime
theaters surrounded by large Islamic populations, which if Islamist attitudes
take hold could develop into areas of future conflict.
THE GAP IN THE CONTINUUM
Confronting these challenges is what navies do. The U.S. Navy is the interna-
tional “cop on the beat.” It cannot be everywhere, but it needs to demonstrate
that it recognizes that at least two aspects of maritime security—the defense of trade
from criminal and political threats and the suppression of maritime insurgency—
are key parts of its mission. It also needs to be able to demonstrate that it can op-
erate across the continuum, from blue water to brown water. As Admiral Mullen
has said, “We cannot sit out in the deep blue, waiting for the enemy to come to
us. . . . We must go to him.”49 To do that effectively will mean changing some of
the ways it does its job. It needs to recognize that there is a significant gap in the
continuum. Recent U.S. doctrine has viewed the littorals as a space over which
expeditionary forces must leap from the fleet to the land, rather than a vital hu-
man and economic space that is often poorly secured, to the point that disrup-
tive, subversive, and criminal elements can operate in it to their advantage and to
the detriment of the host nation and the international community.
Intelligence is key. Technical intelligence-gathering methods might provide
the Navy with a vital edge, or they might not. Currently a heavy investment is be-
ing made in a system of fused sensors to deliver “maritime domain awareness.”
Modern warships depend increasingly on their sensors to interrogate their envi-
ronment. However, in any “war among the people,” empathy is as important as
data.50 Dependence on technical intelligence can make any force deaf to the hu-
man factor.51 Once deaf to that, it is blind to complexity.
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The only way navies will be able to gather this human intelligence is to behave
like their nineteenth-century predecessors by stepping off their ships into boats
and onto land. Sailors will need to recognize that, like ground forces, they will
have to sacrifice a degree of force protection in order to gather information and
interact with the people they are there to win over.
The need, in other words, is to redevelop the old naval virtue of presence. Not
merely persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), the cur-
rent grail of the intelligence community, but physical presence—ships regularly
on station demonstrating particular interest in, and commitment to, the sea
peoples of weak and failing states. It cannot fulfill this task alone, which is why it
needs to develop close relationships with navies around the world and develop
workable and interoperable tactics, techniques, and procedures with navies in
critical and vulnerable areas. The thousand-ship-navy concept encapsulates this
idea. It is an idea that has been misunderstood or mischievously misrepresented
but that if taken forward on the terms of broad equality outlined at the outset
could provide a workable platform for the suppression of maritime disorder.52
The presence of pirates and terrorists is a wake-up call. Their activities serve to
remind the Navy that it cannot stand offshore immune to the complex forms of
warfare that have appeared on land, where the lines between the criminal and the
political have been blurred. The heightened political content of that warfare also
means that the Navy cannot interpret the adjective “maritime,” as in “maritime
counterterrorism,” or even the broad sweep of “maritime security” as “naval” and
therefore take the lead role. It has a role, in many cases an underestimated one, but
as part of a larger interagency force that, under clear political leadership, is able to
draw on all elements of national power, including diplomatic, humanitarian, and
informational. For a navy like the U.S. Navy, though, working with all these ele-
ments is hard-wired into its blood.
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